David Merrefield

About David Merrefield

David Merrefield is principal of DRM Initiatives, Inc., a retailer consulting group. He is the former Vice President and Editor of trade publication Supermarket News. He is based in New York City.

How Do Changes in Brand Loyalty Shift Marketing Responsibilities?

The Robin REportSupermarket retailers are facing a sea change when it comes to how the products they sell are marketed. That responsibility is going to migrate from manufacturers to the retailers themselves before too long.

Why? Because supermarket shoppers are a fickle bunch. And nowhere is that more evident than in their fast-changing attitudes toward brands and their loyalty to them — or, to be more precise, their lack of brand loyalty.

Of course, brand loyalty has been fading for a long time, but for the first time, surveys of motivations behind consumer buying decisions show that a large majority of supermarket shoppers have no brand preference at all. Instead, they are prone to swing between brands, or to opt equally for specialty or store brands.

Several newly issued consumer studies show how dramatic the decline in brand loyalty is. For instance, Deloitte’s American Pantry Study shows that 90% of shoppers at least occasionally will opt for a store brand in lieu of a national brand. That finding is backed by other surveys that indicate a striking 56% of shoppers have no brand loyalty at all.

This lack of brand loyalty gives national manufacturers of consumer packaged goods (CPG) every reason to feel agita. It also means that manufacturers soon won’t have the wherewithal to do all the heavy lifting concerning product promotion.

So, if manufacturers soon won’t promote as effectively, who will? Well, the only player left is the retailer.

Here’s some of what retailers will have to do better on their own:

  • Seize the product-development initiative from national CPG manufacturers. No longer should store brands mimic national brands in content or appearance. Instead, store brands should be high-quality and attractively packaged products in their own right. They should be priced near, or even above, similar national brands’ price points. Supermarkets can also lift a page from Target’s playbook by offering tiers of store brand product ranging from value offerings to high end.
  • Make the supermarket stand for something. It should be conspicuous to shoppers that the store means, say, quality, innovative products, or price. Limited assortment operators including Whole Foods, Trader Joe’s and Aldi, respectively, already do this. Or, like Target, supermarkets can stand for “cheap chic.”
  • Make the supermarket an inviting destination so customers will want to go there instead of viewing shopping as drudgery. That means the supermarket must have high-quality perishables departments, be convenient to shop, and feature high service levels. Supermarket operators Wegmans and Publix already do a good job of this.

Even with those basics under their belts, supermarkets still will face a few challenges. That’s because consumer studies show that huge majorities of shoppers are looking for quality products throughout the store — up to 75% of shoppers say that is what they have in mind.

And, just to complicate things, many shoppers make buying decisions on the basis of whim or desire rather than more rational-seeming reasons.
Finally, retailers must market with this conflicting mandate in mind: shoppers still demand reasonable price points.

Now let’s return to the original issue of the decline of brand loyalty. A multitude of reasons have contributed to the phenomenon, but the longest-running factor is the migration of mass media toward niche media. There was a time when brand owners could blanket the consciousness of consumers with a few strategic ad buys in broadcast and print media. Those days are long gone.

Other factors include consumers’ growing awareness that food and health are intertwined. Consumers also are on constant lookout for new and attractively designed products; some 20% of shoppers seek new-product alternatives during every store trip. Neither of these factors cater to CPGs strong suit.

In the end, maybe it’s just as well that mass marketing is disappearing and consumers are more assertive about what products they want. Retailers using new media to cater to small groups of like-minded consumers or even individual consumers have in their hands the means to present to shoppers just what they’re seeking.

How Trader Joe’s Lures Shoppers With Quirky Products and Brands

Trader Joe's Opening - 08Trader Joe’s is undoubtedly the nation’s most successful limited-assortment grocery chain; lines actually go around the block in New York City’s two outposts during the holidays.

So what’s really going on here? Trader Joe’s uses product and pricing strategies that could easily be emulated by other chains that sell quick-turn consumables. But Trader Joe’s is not just privately held, it is fiercely private, making every effort to fend off any effort to learn how it works.

We do know, however, that Trader Joe’s net sales-per-square-foot are roughly twice those of the similarly situated Whole Foods. And Trader Joe’s performs better in smaller selling spaces, with about a quarter of Whole Foods stockkeeping unit count.

That’s impressive, but the real secret formula is Trader Joe’s product lineup. More than 80% of Trader Joe’s 4,000 SKUs are private brands, most under the Trader Joe’s name, and others under offshoots such as Trader Jose’s (Mexican food) and Trader Josef’s (baked goods), and so on. [Read more...]

Tesco Felled By Hubris, Leaves USA

Quitting the country is the easy part. Now, what about all that infrastructure?

Chronicle of a Failure Foretold

Years from now, MBA students will be puzzling over how Tesco, the British food retailer, could have stumbled so badly in its venture in the United States.

Well, more than stumbled. As I predicted more than a year ago in a news feature in the Robin Report, Tesco has called it quits in the U.S., just five years now after entering the country. Tesco racked up a horrendous record: it managed to open about 200 stores in this county, most in California, plus a few in Arizona and Nevada. It burned through well in excess of $3 billion counting startup costs and cumulative losses during its time in this country. At no time did Tesco turn even a modest profit with its Fresh & Easy stores, as they were dubbed.

farewell_fresh

That dismal outcome stands in ugly contrast to its stated ambitions. Tesco predicted it would have many hundreds of stores in the U.S. by now. It envisioned a quick leap to the East Coast with fill-ins elsewhere yielding a network of 10,000 stores.

The reality of the situation has cost the career of Tim Mason, Tesco’s U.S, chief officer. When Tesco announced in December it was quitting this country, it also said Mason would immediately leave the company. Mason was a 30-year veteran of the company and at one time was seen as the next chief executive officer of all of Tesco. Mason gave it a good shot. He moved to California from Britain with his wife, Fiona, and three of their seven children to direct the fledgling Fresh & Easy empire. Fiona took up golf to wile away the hours while Mason toiled. To the good for Mason, he left with a huge buyout and an astoundingly generous pension.

Tesco now faces the challenge of how to withdraw from the U.S. without abandoning its assets here entirely. [Read more...]

Peapod’s New PUP: Doggone Poor Thinking

peapod_commuter_storePeapod has a new PUP. Unfortunately, it may be a biter.

Peapod is the big grocery delivery service with major operations in the Northeast and the Midwest. It has never been hugely successful, so it sometimes casts around in different directions to invigorate the business. The latest idea is to launch pick-up points, referred to in the industry as PUPs. Peapod now has three dedicated pick-up points in the suburban Chicago area in addition to one attached to a Stop & Shop supermarket outside Boston. (Peapod and Stop & Shop are commonly owned by Ahold.)

The click-and-collect model goes like this: Customers go online and order groceries on Peapod’s website. But instead of waiting for delivery, customers agree to go to a pickup place at a certain time to retrieve their order. This scheme may offer some consumers a vague advantage in that it eliminates waiting at home for delivery and it can reduce or eliminate fees charged for delivery.

Peapod isn’t alone with its PUPs. A number of conventional supermarket retailers have tried PUPs too, not all with success.

The difference is that for conventional retailers, PUPs make a modest amount of sense. It gives established retailers a way to cater to customers who really want to transact business online, but don’t want home delivery. It is also a low-risk proposition for an established retailer. The store itself can be the pickup point and existing personnel can probably be used to pick and package customers’ online orders. So retailers’ PUPs do little harm and if they fail, little is lost. Supermarket giant Publix in the Southeast is among the retailers that tried PUPs, and discontinued them for lack of consumer interest.

That exposes the real problem with PUPS: Many customers just don’t find there to be much convenience associated with ordering online, then picking up. Why not just shop a store and be done with it?

That a company like Peapod is trying PUPs is an especially odd development. Peapod’s core business is the offer of home delivery. If the delivery model is so flawed that it feels obliged to offer customers an alternative, doesn’t that mean that a major part of the business is a failing at some level?

Beyond that, Peapod is operating dedicated pick-up points in the Chicago market, so the cost of failure– if that happens — will be far from negligible. Failure may move closer if Peapod goes through with its plan to charge for pick-ups. The plan is to charge $2.95 for picking up against $6.95 for home delivery. Really? Another reason to use the pick-up service all but vanishes.

It’s time for Peapod to put the PUP on a very short leash.

Supervalu’s Unsuper Future

SuperValu - The Robin ReportIn its most recent fiscal year it scored $36.1 in sales volume, driven by a widely diverse portfolio of assets. Those assets include a large-scale wholesale business plus many retail stores ranging from small chains of to large-scale retail chains and a hard-discount chain. In all, Supervalu has more than 2,400 stores.

Supervalu’s asset diversity evolved, for the most part, over a period of cautious and self-financed growth spanning its 135-year history. The company is based in Minneapolis, but operates from distribution centers in nearly 30 states, effectively blanketing much of the nation.

But there are big problems under the surface. When Supervalu is brought into sharp focus, it starts to look troubling. Clarity reveals it to be currently heavily laden with unaccustomed debt and its profitability long sinking and now vanishing.

It gets worse. Its competitive positioning is melting away and its corporate-management team is in fast-turn mode. Supervalu stock is trading near the $2-mark, except for an occasional upward spike driven by buyout rumors. Earlier this year, its stock sold for about $8; five years ago it approached $45. [Read more...]

Target vs. Amazon: Hungry Games

The Robin Report - TargetSuppose a picture really isn’t worth a thousand words. What then?

“Showrooming” happens, that’s what. Showrooming is the consumer practice of going to a retail store to examine goods to determine more about appearance and functionality than can be ascertained by looking at product online alone. Once satisfied with the products they’ve seen in store, customers order them online to get a better price or greater selection.

Showrooming is taken very seriously by some trade channels – notably mass and consumer electronics – but there’s every reason to believe the practice will quickly spread to other retail channels, including food. Supermarket retailers in particular need to pay attention to what’s going on. Indeed, showrooming is just one of numerous e-commerce threats to conventional food retailing, all of which seem to be gaining greater traction by the day.

Let’s take a look at what one retailer is doing proactively about showrooming.

Perhaps the most dramatic action came earlier this year when Target delisted Amazon’s Kindle book reader from its stores in a bid to discourage showrooming. The action takes on greater significance with the realization that Target, with its 1,800 retail locations, is among the largest offline vendors of Kindle. [Read more...]

Target Builds Sales Volume With Food

Target’s fight against show-rooming presents instructive fodder about how one retailer has endeavored to conquer the problem.

But for food retailers there’s something more immediate going on: Target is emerging as a competitive threat in its own right because of its rapid rollout of PFresh grocery sections. Let’s see how big a threat it is.

Target got off to a slow start in 2008 by adding PFreshsections to a few of its smaller-model stores. Larger Super Targets had grocery sections earlier.
But the pace of PFresh rollouts accelerated, mainly because they could be added to the existing four walls of the store: No vast rebuilds or zoning fights were required. This stands in contrast to Walmart’s large-scale and costly replacement of smaller stores with behemoth Supercenters containing food sections. Walmart had to fight many a battle to accomplish the transformation.

Target now has food sections in well over half its 1,800 locations. Many of those locations are of about 135,000 square feet, net; about 12% of that space is now a PFresh featuring categories such as dry groceries, refrigerated, frozens, baked goods and produce. Target has also developed a strong array of private label food product ranging from the upscale Archer Farms to the value-priced up & up.

PFresh presents a tightly edited selection of fast-moving products. No effort is made to offer shoppers a full supermarket line, which means PFresh is seen by consumers as a food fill-in opportunity if they happen to be in the store anyway. Again, this contrasts with Walmart’s Supercenters, which offer a limited, but full line of supermarket products.

Target achieves more than $13 billion per year in food sales, with sales increasing as time goes on.

Many food-trade observers acknowledge that Target’s sales in the food sector are substantial but, at the same time, Target stores are thinly spread across many markets, effectively limiting PFresh’s ability to divert big proportions of sales from conventional supermarket chains.

Food-sale market shares for Target tend to range from 2% to 3% in many markets, not enough to pose a worrisome threat to incumbent food retailers.
Nonetheless, with Target’s food sales pointed upward, the threat shouldn’t be ignored altogether.

Online-Based Grocery Delivery Thrives At Last

The Robin ReportMuch of the attention in food retailing these days has been focused on electronic-based  marketing such as mobile apps, mobile checkout, QR codes and iPad abilities of all sorts.

That’s all justified, but the biggest action in electronic retailing is in a business sector that was once all but left for dead. That would be online-based grocery ordering and delivery. Right now, online merchants such as Fresh Direct, Peapod and others are doing well enough that they’ve become confident in their own futures and are splurging on costly geographic expansions.

That stands in stark contrast to the fate that befell online grocery merchants several years ago. Back then, numerous conventional retailers and online-only retailers either drastically downsized or failed outright. The most spectacular flameout happened when online grocer Webvan went out of business in 2001 after just a couple years of recklessly expanding and burning through $830 million of investors’ money.

Strangely enough, Fresh Direct, the online delivery service, now considered to be the nation’s most successful, was founded not long after the Webvan fiasco.

How did Fresh Direct manage to wrest success from those ashes?

Possibly the chief difference between Webvan and Fresh Direct can be seen as the space between hubris and prudence. [Read more...]

How Supermarkets Turned Pain at the Pump into a Positive

The Robin ReportThere’s something unnerving about the volatility of petroleum prices.

First they’re up, then they’re down – but somehow the downs aren’t ever as big as the ups and fuel prices continue their upward climb.

Recent weeks have brought another upward move for gasoline and other fuels. Clearly, fuel prices are picking the pockets of consumers to the point at which a large minority of them are changing how they’re stocking their pantries. Those consumers are making every effort to drive fewer miles, to shop less frequently, and to turn to hard discounters. They’re also on a constant quest for price breaks at the pump.
What impact is this having on the conventional- supermarket retail channel?
Oddly enough, many supermarket chains have turned high fuel prices to their advantage. They’re pumping up renewed attention on promotions that couple consumers’ supermarket food spend with a chance to earn substantial discounts at the gas pump. [Read more...]

Why Shoppers Won’t Do Supermarket’s Work

The most valuable technology-based power a business could hope for is one that would inspire its customers to willingly perform tasks that were previously done by its employees. Although many consumer-facing businesses have been able to accomplish just that, retailing in general, and supermarkets in particular, lag behind.

A few business sectors have been transformed by transferring labor from employees to customers, even though they remain location based (their customers must come to them.) The banking industry’s success with ATMs is the best example of that.

Additionally, self-serve fuel purchases are on the rise everywhere but in New Jersey and Oregon, where they’re still against the law. Many libraries have patron-operated book-checkout abilities. The U.S. Postal Service makes wide use of customer-operated machines that allow patrons to mail parcels, insure them or buy postage without interacting with a clerk.

Other business sectors, like travel agents and bookstores, have been transformed by the Internet to the point that traditional walk-in stores are scarcely required. [Read more...]

How One Smart Company Got It All Wrong

Suppose you’re the CEO of a successful, multinational food retailer. You’ve had good luck opening stores in numerous countries, many with cultures much different from that of your home country.

You’ve decided the time is right to roll out a fleet of stores in yet another country, this time one that has a culture quite similar to your own.
You’re confronted with many questions to be answered and decisions you need to make, such as:

Should you conduct consumer research, or just send a team of executives to the target country to examine the situation on the ground?

Will you develop a store format similar to the type of shopping experience in the target country, or a brand new format?

Will you source product for the new stores from a third-party distributor while the format is being fine-tuned, or will you spend vast sums developing your own distribution and production prior to opening a single store? [Read more...]

Why Walmart Failed To Crush Conventional Supermarkets

Those of us who have followed the food-retailing industry for a while recall well that just a few years ago it was widely predicted that Walmart Stores’ grocery aisles — increasingly burgeoning with low-priced product — would crush the conventional supermarket business.

It seemed like a safe bet at the time. After all, Walmart bestrode the land like a colossus, hurling down gigantic and food-heavy supercenters in virtually every hamlet that had even a fair amount of population within a 50-mile radius.

More than that, Walmart was building an unassailable low-price bastion by taking full advantage of the built-in inefficiencies endemic in the product-acquisition practices of conventional supermarkets. Walmart did that by eschewing manufacturers’ false funds such as promotional money, slotting allowances and brokerage fees. Instead, Walmart demanded and got dead-net pricing from manufacturers. There was no way conventional supermarkets could immediately reverse-engineer their way out of dependence of those “street monies,” so they were stuck with the high-price-point model. Before long, Walmart captured a majority of consumables sales in the nation. Between 2006 and 2010, Walmart’s grocery sales grew from 39% to 54% of its US revenues, reaching a whopping $140 billion, or almost a third of the US market. That’s a lot of milk and hamburgers.

[Read more...]